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Abstract 
There has been little investigation to date of the way metacognition is involved in conceptual 
change. It has been recognised that analytic metacognition is important to the way older 
children (c. 8-12 years) acquire more sophisticated scientific and mathematical concepts at 
school. But there has been barely any examination of the role of metacognition in earlier 
stages of concept acquisition, at the ages that have been the major focus of the 
developmental psychology of concepts. The growing evidence that even young children have 
a capacity for procedural metacognition raises the question of whether and how these abilities 
are involved in conceptual development. More specifically, are there developmental changes 
in metacognitive abilities that have a wholescale effect on the way children acquire new 
concepts and replace existing concepts? We show that there is already evidence of at least 
one plausible example of such a link and argue that these connections deserve to be 
investigated systematically. 
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(1) Introduction 
It is often thought that various kinds of metacognition are central to the way children learn, 
especially in an educational setting (Blank, 2000; Thomas, 2012). Increasing metacognitive 
sophistication supports their learning processes. It is part of what makes their thinking 
become more mature. In this paper we explore whether metacognition supports a specific 
kind of developmental process – the process that changes the child’s conceptual resources. In 
particular, we ask whether changes in metacognitive abilities lead to changes in the way the 
child’s concepts alter during learning and development. 
 
What is conceptual change? Take the case of how children’s concept of the earth is revised 
during the school years. The majority of first-graders think of the earth as a flat disk at the 
centre of the solar system (Özsoy, 2017). During the education process children revise their 
concept of earth until they think of it as a sphere rotating around the sun (Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992). This outcome is a difficult achievement. The path to change is full of cognitive 
obstacles: some of them come from innate cognitive constraints (Carey 2009), some from 
everyday experiences and observations that inform children’s framework theories (Wellman 
& Gelman, 1998), some others from individual variations in learning, and from motivational 
factors. As a result, changes in children’s concept of earth do not occur effortlessly, but are 
the outcome of a learning process. That process involves, among other factors, explicit 
reflection on the beliefs associated with the original concept and on the way new pieces of 
information fail to integrate within the framework of the original concept (Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992). Explicit reflection is a metacognitive process.  
 
While in the earth example we can identify a (relatively) clear case of conceptual change, what 
exactly counts as a conceptual change depends one’s theory of concepts and of conceptual 
change. In this paper we will consider cases of conceptual change that are simpler than this 
example. We will also consider cases of metacognition that are less reflective than the explicit 
and rich metacognitive process involved in changing one’s concept of earth – in particular, we 
will explore the possible role of procedural metacognition in conceptual change, such as a 
feeling of confidence that is attached to the old concept of earth and that might slow down 
the process of change. After briefly sketching the notions of conceptual change and 
metacognition we will work with, we define them in greater detail in sections 2 and 3, 
respectively.  
 
Metacognition can be defined via its functional role in cognition (Proust, 2010) as the set of 
processes that monitor and control cognitive activity (which includes perceiving, planning, 
categorising, remembering, learning, desiring, reasoning, intending and acting). Monitoring 
refers to the processes involved in the supervision of cognitive activities while they unfold, 
and in evaluating their progress and success in respect to the goal of a specific task; control 
refers to the top-down management and regulation of cognitive processes that makes use of 
feedback from monitoring, of the goals of the person, and of her background beliefs and 
theories about the cognitive process in question and her own abilities (Koriat, 2016; Proust, 
2010). 
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Metacognition plays a role in conceptual thought. Concepts are mental representations that 
are involved in a variety of cognitive processes, such as categorising, recalling from semantic 
memory, and making inferences. There are at least three ways in which metacognition is 
involved with conceptual thought: metacognition attached to concept use (Shea, 2019), 
metacognition attached to the bodies of information associated with a concept;1 and 
metacognition involved in the process of conceptual change. Here we consider only the last 
of these. 
 
Conceptual change is an area of cognitive development that has been much-studied by 
developmental psychologists (Carey, 2009; Carey & Spelke, 1994; Keil, 1989; Opfer & Siegler, 
2004). This paper asks about the role of metacognition in the process of conceptual change, 
including in concept acquisition, concept revision, and concept replacement. So far there has 
been little systematic investigation of the way metacognition is involved in conceptual change. 
Here we make the case that there are likely to be interesting connections between 
metacognitive development and conceptual development. It is plausible that changes in the 
child’s metacognitive abilities can have an across-the-board effect on the way they acquire 
new concepts and change their pre-existing concepts. A metacognitive change may usher in a 
new stage of conceptual development. 
 
That is an enticing prospect. There is currently relatively little direct evidence – unsurprisingly, 
since it has not been sought. Here we suggest there is preliminary evidence for one previously-
unrecognized connection between metacognitive development and conceptual change, and 
we motivate the search for more. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss types of conceptual change and the 
theory of concepts we’re working with. In section 3, we set out the important distinction 
between two different varieties of metacognition: analytic and procedural. In section 4, we 
overview how metacognition develops across the ages with the aim of identifying 
metacognitive developments that could play a role in the process of conceptual change. In 
section 5, we develop a hypothesis about the relation between metacognitive overconfidence 
and resistance to change. In section 6, we discuss the relation between the acquisition of a 
theory of mind and metacognitive development. In section 7 we discuss the role of analytic 
metacognition in thinking with analogies as part of the process of conceptual change. In 
section 8 we formulate some predictions. Finally, section 9 is a brief conclusion.  
 
 
(2) Conceptual Change 
How radical does a change of a concept have to be to count as an interesting conceptual 
change? For our purposes we don’t need to presuppose that there is any hard-and-fast answer 
to that question. We take our lead from the kinds of conceptual change that have been of 
interest in developmental psychology, for example: moving from a flat to a spherical 
conception of the earth (Vosniadou, 1994), distinguishing between weight and density (Smith, 
Snir, & Grosslight, 1992), and distinguishing between properties of objects and of stuffs (Carey 
& Spelke, 1994; Spelke & Van de Walle, 1993). While there are interesting parallelisms 
between conceptual change at the individual level in development and at the group level in 
                                                     
1  E.g. to prototypes, exemplars, theories, semantic memories and sensorimotor expectations. 
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history of science (Carey, 2009; Thagard, 2018), we restrict our attention to changes at the 
individual level. 
 
Asking how an individual’s concepts change raises the broader question of how concepts 
should be individuated. Developmental psychologists working on conceptual change usually 
appeal to the theory theory of concepts (Carey, 2009): concepts are bodies of beliefs and 
knowledge inter-connected in a web of theoretical postulates and observations, modelled on 
scientific theories. Conceptual change is thus a process of change in theoretical 
understanding. We want to discuss conceptual change in a way that is not committed to the 
theory theory of concepts. The reason is that conceptual change could occur not only for 
concepts as theories, but also for concepts as prototypes or exemplars, for concepts as 
definitions (if there are any), or for concepts as atomic symbols with associated bodies of 
information. We will be working with a more inclusive approach to concepts, where by 
concept we mean a mental representation that encodes information about a given category, 
including information that governs how it is applied to the world and used in inference.  This 
information may consist of beliefs, inferential dispositions and/or sensorimotor expectations. 
Thus, our discussion of conceptual change will not be hostage to the truth of a particular 
theory of concepts. Our task is not to solve the controversy of what counts as a change in a 
concept rather than as a change of concepts. 
 
The examples of conceptual change at the start of this section all involve changing some kind 
of theory or schema, rather than just changing a single belief. One way of talking about 
conceptual change, without having to resolve the vexed question of how concepts should be 
individuated, is to focus on coarse- rather than fine-grained individuation of cognitive 
structures (Strevens, 2019, p. 64). Psychologists working on conceptual change often focus on 
representational schemes rather than on a particular set of representations (such as a 
description, a theory, a prototype or an exemplar). Conceptual change occurs when the 
scheme corresponding to a set of terms (e.g. heat, living being, natural number terms) changes 
in a major way (Strevens, 2019, p. 65). We can talk about these cases by saying what has 
changed in each case without needing a general way of individuating conceptual schemas, and 
without being committed to a particular way of individuating concepts. Following Thagard 
(2018), we will take conceptual changes to include: addition of new information to a concept, 
deletion of information from a concept, simple reorganisation (differentiation, coalition, 
decomposition), revisionary reorganisation, hierarchy redefinition, and also changes in the 
domain of application of a concept (Clement, 2013). Conceptual change from this broad 
perspective includes both changes in the information encoded with a concept, and more 
radical changes such as replacement of a concept or acquisition of a second concept. 
 
Our catholic approach to theories of concepts is close to the spirit of current pluralistic 
approaches to concepts (Weiskopf, 2009). Recent theories of concepts conceive them either 
as complex hybrids which include different bodies of information (Vicente & Martínez 
Manrique, 2014) or as plural categories that contain as sub-categories different bodies of 
information (Weiskopf, 2009). The body of information used depends on the task and on the 
context at hand.2 For example, a concept may be applied on the basis of surface features (e.g. 
                                                     
2  This is compatible with specific bodies of information involving metacognition differently: theories 
might involve analytic and inferential forms of metacognition, while prototypes might involve 
procedural forms of metacognition, for example the principle of the least cognitive effort. One should 
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for quick visual categorisation) or on the basis of inferences about an underlying essence (e.g., 
for making inferences about members that fall under the concept) (Keil, 1989). A change from 
the first psychological structure to the second counts as a conceptual change, and does so 
irrespective of whether it should count as a change in a concept or a change of one concept 
into another. Similarly, acquiring concepts of natural numbers is a matter of acquiring a new 
psychological structure: an unbounded collection of concepts about numerosity that are 
inferentially linked via the successor relation (Carey, 2009). 
 
We have listed types of conceptual change. But what are the mechanisms of conceptual 
change? The developmental literature offers some proposals for the mechanisms. One 
possible mechanism is maturation, where innate learning constraints express themselves in 
the right environment (Carey & Spelke, 1994). Another theory is canalization: first a concept 
is acquired and then children learn about the things that the concept refers to from experience 
(Carey, 2009). There are also proposals intermediate between these two, such as Xu and 
Tenenbaum’s Bayesian learning approach that integrates learning constraints and learning 
from experience (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). Finally, some types of conceptual change are 
supported by explicit instruction in an educational setting. The first three mechanisms involve 
learning only at the object level, while the last kind is widely taken to involve metacognition 
(of an explicit, analytic kind). Here we are interested in whether metacognition (of some kind) 
also plays a role in other kinds of mechanisms of concept-acquisition and concept-change.  
 
 
(3) Procedural As Well As Analytic Metacognition 
The idea that developmental changes in metacognition drive changes in cognitive 
performance in general has long been a mainstay of educational psychology (Flavell, 1979). 
As well as memory and mnemonic strategies, this work has focused on aspects of the school 
curriculum like reading, language learning, and science (Haukås, Bjørke, & Dypedahl, 2018; 
Kraayenoord, 2010; Thomas, 2012). For example, work on science education has found that 
understanding one’s own mental states and theories is crucial to the way children learn new 
scientific knowledge, as is the reflective use of analogies to provide new ways of thinking 
about a domain (Carey, 2000; Clement, 2013; Hennessey, Beeth, & Zietsman, 1996; Thagard, 
1992). Understanding one’s own mental states comes with the acquisition of a theory of mind 
at around 4 years of age (Ruffman & Perner, 2005). While this is an important developmental 
stage, it is unlikely that it plays an across the board role in conceptual change (for reasons 
outlined in section 6).  
 
Relatively little work on metacognition in educational settings has focused specifically on 
conceptual change, despite the wealth of developmental psychology on the topic, much at 
earlier ages (for exceptions see (Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003; Vosniadou, 2007)). Nonetheless, our 
examination of existing research on the two topics suggests that they are likely to be 
connected in illuminating ways. This involves looking at whether metacognition is involved in 
early concept acquisition, in pre-school children and children at the beginning of school, as 
well as for concepts acquired at school age like concepts of rational numbers and biological 
                                                     
distinguish between metacognition associated with the body of information, and metacognitive 
processes involved in conceptual change. Our focus here is on the latter. We are grateful to Joëlle Proust 
for helping us clarify this issue. 
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categories. We need to look carefully at metacognition in younger children, before the age (c. 
8-12 years) when they have explicit knowledge about their memory capabilities and the use 
of explicit analogies. Explicit knowledge about memory capabilities and reflective use of 
analogies are rather late achievements (Schneider & Pressley, 2013), but children change their 
concepts even before that age.  
 
The other way we need to enlarge our focus is to examine procedural and not only analytic 
metacognition (Flavell & Wellman, 1975; Koriat, 2016; Proust, 2013). Analytic metacognition 
encompasses explicit beliefs about first-order mental states and processes, for example about 
effective memory strategies (Son, 2004). Analytic metacognition draws on people’s folk beliefs 
about how the mind works, which may be false. Procedural metacognition is based on feelings 
attached to cognitive processes, like a feeling of fluency during recall or a feeling of knowing 
when considering a question (these feelings can be collected under the broad notion of ‘noetic 
feelings’, see (Proust, 2013)). Unlike analytic metacognition, procedural metacognition is 
thought to exist in non-human animals (Beran, Brandl, Perner, & Proust, 2012; Hampton, 
2009). Feelings can be used directly to guide behaviour, or they can be used to formulate 
judgements, for example a feeling of fluency can be the basis for a judgement of confidence 
(Schwarz, 2012).  
 
What is the connection between procedural metacognition and conceptual change in the early 
stages of development? Some forms of procedural metacognition develop early (Goupil & 
Kouider, 2016; Goupil, Romand-Monnier, & Kouider, 2016). This opens up the possibility that 
procedural metacognition might be involved in early stages of conceptual development, 
whether it is acquisition, formation, or replacement of concepts. Changes in procedural 
metacognition, and not only the development of analytic metacognition, may open up across-
the-board changes in the way concepts are learnt. Yet, procedural metacognition has been 
largely overlooked in the educational literature on learning, even if it is now recognised that 
procedural metacognition might be effective in guiding behaviour even in the absence of 
explicit metacognitive reports (Kim, Paulus, Sodian, & Proust, 2016).  
 
One form of procedural metacognition that is relevant here is confidence (estimation of the 
correctness of one’s knowledge). Pre-school children exhibit generalised overconfidence, 
even in the face of disconfirming evidence (Schneider, 1998). Once a child has acquired a 
functioning concept in a domain (e.g. LIVING THING), generalised overconfidence could present 
an obstacle to changing it when new evidence is provided, because the overconfident child 
sees no reason to revise her concept.3 
 
This evidence suggests the possibility that a metacognitive change such that the child is better 
able to recognise inconsistencies and reduce their confidence as a result may be an important 
gateway to conceptual change: to gaining a new concept to supplement or replace the 
                                                     
3  We need to distinguish between self-confidence and confidence. Self-confidence refers to a person’s 
trust in her own ability to succeed and learn across different tasks. In a learning environment, self-
overconfidence might play an adaptive role in fostering motivation, in stimulating a child (or an adult) 
to learn and explore more (Chen & Schildberg-Hörisch, 2019). Confidence occurs in the context of a 
specific task, by measuring the person’s estimation of the correctness of her response. An over-
confident person (in the context of a task) would think she has given a correct response when she has 
made a mistake. Self-overconfidence and overconfidence can potentially be studied independently. 
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defective one, for example when children revise their concept of earth from being flat to being 
round. That is one case where a developmental change in metacognition plausibly leads to 
wholescale changes in what kinds of concept are acquired and how they are learnt. Our 
hypothesis in section 5 will be that lifting the confidence bias as a functional connection 
between (procedural) metacognition and conceptual change, and that one way of reducing 
the confidence bias is via the detection of inconsistencies. That is just one possible connection, 
but it shows that it will be worthwhile systematically to investigate this and other potential 
connections between metacognitive changes and stages of conceptual development. In the 
next section we review the literature on metacognitive development in general, with the aim 
of identifying metacognitive changes that are candidates to have an impact on conceptual 
development. 
 
 
(4) Metacognitive Development 
The two types of metacognition identified in the previous section are likely to relate to 
conceptual change in different ways: while analytic metacognition is important later in 
development, procedural metacognition may play a role for conceptual change much earlier. 
This is mirrored by their dissimilar maturation paths: analytic and procedural metacognition 
show different developmental patterns (Schneider & Löffler, 2016). Analytic metacognition, 
initially poor, increases substantially during school-age years, often as a result of teaching. 
Procedural metacognition that monitors cognitive processes, for example the feeling of 
confidence, stretches back to early childhood (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008).  
 
This section looks at the way metacognition in general develops in childhood. Not all of these 
changes will be relevant to conceptual development, but our aim is to identify potential 
candidates: metacognitive changes that may have a large-scale effect on the way concepts are 
acquired or changed in development. Metacognition of memory, which has been studied 
extensively, offers a useful literature; and we look first at children’s analytic metacognition 
about memory. When starting school, children overestimate their own memory capabilities 
and show little appreciation of how memory varies (Schneider & Löffler, 2016). By 9 to 11 
years old, children know that memorisation skills vary from person to person and from 
situation to situation (Kreutzer, Leonard, Flavell, & Hagen, 1975). Knowledge of memory 
strategies also improves in the school years. It is not until 8-, 9- or 10-years-old that children 
appreciate that taxonomic or semantic organisational structure (for example, that items such 
as “chair-table” belong to the semantic category “furniture”) confers a memory advantage 
(Moynahan, 1978; Sodian & Schneider, 1999). Knowledge of the combined influence of 
variables like effort and the number of items to be memorised continues to develop through 
the school years into adolescence (Schneider & Pressley, 2013).  
 
Outside the domain of memory, other forms of analytic metacognition develop during the 
schooling years. One such form is the use of explicit analogies. Explicit analogising involves 
reflecting on one’s way of thinking about one domain and self-consciously deploying it to think 
about a different domain. This is one form of metacognition that has been thought to play a 
role in conceptual development, typically in the later stages of elementary school (8-12 years 
old), for example in acquiring a mature conception of the circulation system (Mason, 1994), 
of rational numbers (Carey 2009, ch. 9), and of weight and density (Carey 2009, ch. 10). 
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In short, analytic metacognition does develop in the school age years, and is used self-
reflectively in learning subtler scientific and mathematical concepts in the later years of 
primary school. What about changes in procedural metacognition? 
 
Procedural metacognition is observed in infants in the form of confidence or the monitoring 
of uncertainty. 20-month-old infants given the chance to ask for help in a memory task do so 
strategically, making requests selectively to avoid making errors (Goupil et al., 2016). 12- and 
18-month-old infants exhibit a neural signature that they evaluate their decision in a memory 
task, and use their uncertainty adaptively to change their mind when given the opportunity 
(Goupil & Kouider, 2016). When their confidence is low they also search less long for a hidden 
object. These experiments go beyond the widespread finding that infants are sensitive to 
violation-of-expectation, which happens when an unexpected event occurs, without the need 
for a metacognitive evaluation (Aslin, 2007). They show that even one-year-old infants 
monitor their certainty and uncertainty in a decision – a form of procedural metacognition. By 
two years old children are monitoring their own state of knowledge or ignorance, 
communicating it verbally and non-verbally, and using this monitoring as a basis for requesting 
more information (Geurten & Bastin, 2019; Harris, Bartz, & Rowe, 2017). Slightly older 
children can be directly asked to rate their confidence in an answer they have given to memory 
question. Even 3-year-olds show some metacognitive sensitivity, giving higher confidence 
ratings for correct than for incorrect answers (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008; Lyons & Ghetti, 
2011).4  
 
Metacognitive feelings can be used to formulate judgements of confidence. There is a 
developmental trend for judgments based on procedural metacognitive experiences and 
feelings. The accuracy of trial-by-trial confidence judgements is initially low. It improves 
considerably in the early school years so that by 7 or 8 years old children can accurately report 
whether an answer is likely to be correct (Krebs & Roebers, 2012; Von der Linden & Roebers, 
2006), provided the questions are not asked in a misleading way; although children, like (in 
some cases) adults, continue to show a bias towards overconfidence (Roebers, 2002; Roebers, 
von der Linden, Schneider, & Howie, 2007). 
 
Children given pairs of objects to remember can be tested by presenting one object and asking 
whether they are likely to remember which object it was paired with. At a slightly younger age 
(around 6 years old), children are relatively accurate in these judgements of learning (‘JoLs’), 
provided the question is asked after a delay (Schneider, Visé, Lockl, & Nelson, 2000).5 
However, children’s errors are in the direction of overconfidence, especially when making 
predictions: preschool children are very overconfident when they predict how well they will 
recall items in the future (Lipko, Dunlosky, Lipowski, & Merriman, 2012; Lipko, Dunlosky, & 
Merriman, 2009), but there is a marked change in overconfidence towards better calibration 
in the first years of school. At an older age (by 12 years old), children’s JoLs are relatively 
accurate and do not change markedly thereafter (van Loon, de Bruin, van Gog, & van 
                                                     
4  Although implicit measures might reveal conflict with explicit, verbal measures: infants who are good 
at monitoring their cognitive states may fail at reporting them in explicit measures (Kim et al., 2016).  
 
5  The benefit of delay in forming accurate JoLs is true of adults as well as children (Rhodes & Tauber, 
2011). 
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Merriënboer, 2013). Pre-school children are also very overconfident when making ‘ease of 
learning’ judgements, predicting in advance whether they will be able to remember a word 
list (Worden & Sladewski-Awig, 1982; Yussen & Levy Jr, 1975).  
 
Overconfidence in younger children has also been detected in relation to concept learning. 
When learning new concepts, 8 years olds are overconfident in their JoLs regardless of their 
inability to generate sentences using the new concept, while older children (around 11 years 
old) show overconfidence when they can generate a test sentence for the new concept (van 
Loon, de Bruin, Leppink, & Roebers, 2017). The presence of overconfidence in infants’ 
monitoring of concept learning leads to less restudy time, which in turn has a detrimental 
impact on mastering new concepts (van Loon et al., 2017).  
 
The two components of metacognition also show a developmental trend. Regarding control, 
there is a clear developmental trend in self-regulation – top-down control including planning, 
directing, and evaluating one’s behaviour – and in the relation between monitoring and 
control (Schneider & Löffler, 2016). Regarding monitoring and its use for control, the school-
age child becomes better able to monitor their first-order states and to make use of feelings 
of high versus low confidence to control their cognitive processes and guide their learning 
(Koriat & Ackerman, 2010). 
 
In summary, analytic metacognition grows more sophisticated throughout children’s school 
years, with the explicit use of analogies, and many learning strategies, not appearing until 9-
12 years old, so it plausibly plays a role only for later cases of conceptual change. Procedural 
metacognition appears much earlier and is largely stable by this age. Changes in procedural 
metacognition might affect the pattern of earlier cases of conceptual change. Many forms of 
procedural metacognition are characterised by pronounced overconfidence in preschool 
children, which gives way to broadly accurate judgements of learning and confidence by 12 
years old. In the next section we look at the possible role of metacognitive overconfidence in 
a process of conceptual change. 
 
 
(5) Overconfidence and Metacognitive Disequilibration 
We saw in the previous section that children are initially highly overconfident and 
subsequently develop better calibration. A reduction in overconfidence is one metacognitive 
change that could cause an across the board change in the way concepts are acquired and 
revised. Overconfidence is tested by asking children to produce judgements of learning, that 
is predictions about how likely they will be to remember a learnt piece of information when 
given a cue.   
 
When the child already has concepts in a domain they often become resistant to change. A 
period of disequilibration is needed before the child overcomes this resistance and acquires a 
new concept. This is true in many domains: naïve physics, intuitive biology, the astronomical 
concept of the earth, and the rational numbers. Disequilibration here indicates the detection 
of inconsistencies as a path to confidence reduction. As the study by van Loon et al. (2017)  
shows, overconfidence has a detrimental effect on the acquisition of new concepts. Could it 
also play a detrimental role in the revision of concepts? 
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The mere detection of a contradiction is not enough to drive a process of conceptual change: 
Carey (1999) describes the case of a 4-year-old child who notices a local contradiction in her 
concept of “living being” and yet fails to revise her concept. Why does a 4-year-old fail to use 
a contradiction to revise her concept? This might be due to overconfidence. It is thus 
important to distinguish between the mere detection of the presence of a contradiction (a 
process of ‘local disequilibration’ as used by Carey) and a cumulative process of metacognitive 
disequilibration. Metacognitive disequilibration is a matter of the child becoming aware that 
there are contradictions in their current beliefs and concepts, and that the predictions they 
make are not reliable. 
 
Metacognitive disequilibration is not easy to achieve. Overconfidence stands in the way of 
becoming disequilibrated.6 Thus, the developmental change in procedural metacognition 
identified above, away from overconfidence and towards reasonably accurate metacognition 
by age 7 or 8, is an essential precursor to the kinds of conceptual change that depend upon 
metacognitive disequilibration.7 For example, Karmiloff-Smith studied children’s naïve 
physics, in the form of their understanding of the laws of torque involved in balancing bricks 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1991). By 6 or 7 years old, children had learnt a systematic rule for solving 
this task, but they were overconfident about it, sticking with the rule even when it manifestly 
failed (when using asymmetrically weighted bricks). Only by 8 or 9 years old did children learn 
from experience about the rule’s limitations. By this age overconfidence is reduced and 
children’s confidence judgements about task performance have reached near-adult levels of 
accuracy. 
 
At the stage when children are metacognitively unaware of contradictions they take on board 
contradictory claims and integrate them into a ‘synthetic concept’. Children’s initial 
conception of the earth is of a flat disk. By 8 years old they have learnt that the earth is a 
sphere that revolves around the sun, but they appear to integrate this belief into a synthetic 
model that also includes their initial beliefs. It is only later at 10 years old, when they become 
aware of the contradiction, that children acquire the scientific concept of the spherical earth 
(Vosniadou, 1994; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). For this transition, it seems that it occurs when 
the child is aware of the unreliability of their beliefs. Awareness of the unreliability of their 
beliefs seems thus needed to acquire the new concept. Metacognitive disequilibration is also 
a stepping stone towards acquiring the mature concept of a living thing by age 7 (Carey, 1985; 
Crider, 1981; Keil, 1979), of blood circulation by 10 years old (Mason, 1994) and of the rational 
numbers (between 8 and 12: Carey 2009, ch. 9).  
 
Not all episodes of disequilibration lead to conceptual change. Sometimes the conflict is 
resolved by keeping incompatible explanations, but articulating them at different levels, or 
                                                     
6  Overconfidence itself also calls for explanation. However, we don’t here explore the origins of 
overconfidence. Are children overconfident because the old concept’s use is more fluent (and thus 
easier to use), because they can’t integrate knowledge (Kintsch, 1994), or because of motivation? The 
relation between overconfidence and these factors is left for future research. 
7  Metacognitive disequilibration could come from a variety of sources: from the child’s own errors, from 
others’ instructions, and might also involve factors such as better executive functions or attentional 
control. These factors are important in development, but they do not seem to be the driving force 
behind conceptual change on their own: for example, Chinese children, who perform better on 
measures of executive functions than American children, still acquire theory of mind concepts at the 
same age (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). 
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applying them to different aspects of the phenomenon (Legare & Shtulman, 2018). Indeed, 
it’s possible that once a new concept has been acquired, there is a period of competition 
between the new concept and the old one. The subsistence of co-existing explanations does 
not contradict the role of metacognition in conceptual change discussed in this paper: we only 
look at cases where inconsistency is resolved in a change and try to uncover the process that 
could explain why a child is stuck at that stage and what allows her to overcome it.  
 
In short, a development in procedural metacognition in the early school years, away from 
overconfidence and towards better metacognitive accuracy, seems to have an across-the-
board effect on the way concepts are acquired. The child has to learn new concepts in domains 
where they have concepts already. Their resistance is overcome when they become aware 
that their beliefs are contradictory and their predictions fail, a prerequisite for which is the 
loss of the strong bias towards overconfidence characteristic of procedural metacognition in 
pre-school children. 
 
This is a hypothesis in need of testing. One possible test is to split children in a process of 
conceptual revision into two groups, and measure their confidence levels at the beginning, 
then intervene in one group to highlight inconsistencies between their old concept and new 
information, measure whether their confidence is reduced as a result, compare the process 
of conceptual revision in the two groups, and examine whether any differences in conceptual 
change are mediated by differences in confidence bias. 
 
 
(6) Theory of mind 
In the previous section we focused on a potential role of procedural metacognition for 
conceptual change. What about analytic metacognition?   
 
One way in which analytic metacognition could play a role in conceptual change is in the 
acquisition of a theory of mind. Theory of mind could be relevant to our question in one of 
two ways. First, acquisition of explicit theory of mind could depend on a prior change in 
metacognitive abilities. Second, self-application of theory of mind could itself be a 
metacognitive ability which has an across the board effect on subsequent conceptual 
development. We consider these in turn. 
 
First off, is there some global change in metacognitive abilities that opens the way for the child 
to acquire a theory of mind, that is, explicit concepts of belief, desire, knowledge and 
intention? This question has not been systematically investigated (with the exception of Kim, 
Shahaeian & Proust, 2018), but the brief review of changes in metacognitive abilities above 
does not throw up any obvious candidates. While there is considerable evidence (e.g. Onishi 
& Baillargeon, 2005) that even infants are able to keep track of others’ belief states in some 
ways (but cf. Heyes (2014)), children are not able to give accurate explicit reports of another 
person’s false beliefs until between 3 and 4 years old (Ruffman & Perner, 2005). One potential 
explanation is the development of executive function – not until this age have children 
developed sufficiently sophisticated executive capacities to deal with the demands of the task 
(Helming, Strickland, & Jacob, 2016). The executive function development hypothesis for the 
failure to manifest an explicit mastery of mental states concepts has not received widespread 
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support (Sabbagh, Benson, & Kuhlmeier, 2013). But even if there were a change in executive 
functions that had a global impact on conceptual development, it would not obviously be a 
change in metacognitive abilities.  
 
Conversely, applying the concept of belief is a form of explicit metacognition,8 so we can ask 
whether its acquisition has a global effect on concept acquisition. Do children acquire new 
kinds of concept or learn concepts in new ways once they have an explicit theory of mind? 
Again, the prospects of a connection here are not promising. For example, understanding false 
mental representations does not appear to endow the child with a general purpose 
understanding that representations can be false in other domains. Acquisition of explicit 
theory of mind does not correlate with the age at which a child comes to understand that a 
photograph can be false, for example (Zaitchik, 1990).9 4-year-olds who were successful at the 
false belief task, performed at chance in the false photograph task. 
 
Given the connection between being alive and having a mind, having a concept of belief seems 
like it could be a precursor to forming more sophisticated biological concepts, such as the 
concepts of agent and of living being, but there does not seem to be a tight connection. 
Children with Williams’ syndrome pass the false belief task at around four years of age, thus 
showing standard development of a theory of mind and the possession of domain-specific 
metarepresentational abilities, but they do not show the same path to conceptual change in 
the domain of intuitive biology. They do not change their concept of a living being between 6 
and 10 years of age (which is roughly: an object capable of self-propelled motion). They apply 
it to cars, while children in the same age range who don’t have Williams’ syndrome correctly 
categorize cars as being non-living (Carey & Johnson, 2000). According to Carey and Johnson 
this shows that theory of mind does not “make available the machinery to support conceptual 
change” (p. 231) and that theory of mind is not a precondition for conceptual change in naïve 
biology. 
 
Both these cases suggest that acquiring theory of mind is a matter of getting some domain-
specific concepts (believe, know, desire, intend) and thus an understanding of 
metarepresentation in a domain-specific way, as well as acquiring a set of beliefs about how 
the mind works, without producing a deeper underlying change in the ability to acquire 
concepts in general. 
 
This does not mean that there is no connection at all between the acquisition of a theory of 
mind and metacognition. Indeed, there is an impact of theory of mind on analytic 
metacognition (Lockl & Schneider, 2007), but that is unsurprising since analytic metacognition 
                                                     
8  One such proposal for the relation between mindreading and explicit metacognition has been suggested 
by Perner, according to whom the acquisition of mental state concepts provides the child with meta-
representational abilities that she then uses in metacognition (Perner, Huemer, & Leahy, 2015).  
 
9  In the experiment, an actor places an object in location A and takes a photo of it; then another actor 
moves the object to location B, and the test question to the child is: “In the picture, where is the 
object?”. This experimental design mirrors the one used to test understanding of false beliefs. Perner 
and Leekam (2008) argue that the false photograph test in reality does not test children’s understanding 
of “falsity”, because, according to them, the photograph is in fact a true representation of the situation 
at the time it was taken in the past. Zaitchik, on the other hand, argues that the false photograph test 
detects a difficulty in understanding representations. 
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partly involves making use of the concept of belief (and other mental state concepts). To the 
extent that sophisticated analytic metacognition opens up new ways of learning concepts – 
like the explicit use of analogies in learning new scientific concepts – acquiring explicit theory 
of mind is an early staging post on the way to this much later outcome, but it is not the only 
ingredient in the way metacognition is involved in these later conceptual changes. We 
examine these in the next section. They draw on richer forms of analytic metacognition, that 
may or may not involve mindreading. 
 
Apart from domain-specific impacts of the mastery of mental state terms on analytic 
metacognition, does theory of mind influence procedural metacognition as well? This 
question hasn’t been investigated in-depth, but recent evidence suggests a negative answer: 
success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in tasks involving procedural 
metacognition, for meta-perception (Bernard, Proust & Clément 2015) and for meta-memory 
(Balcomb & Gerken, 2008).  
 
 
(7) Analogising 
Another way in which analytic metacognition could play a role in conceptual change is via the 
use of analogies. This role has been extensively studied in the educational literature. Using 
and recognising analogies is crucial to the way children learn many scientific and mathematical 
concepts. It is one of the most studied tools for teaching and learning in the educational 
literature. The use of analogies in learning has (with some exceptions) a positive influence on 
learning (Vosniadou & Skopeliti, 2019).  An analogy involves two concepts (usually from 
different domains) and a mapping between the two, but without a combination or integration 
of the two concepts. Using an analogy might not require metacognition, but the reflective use 
of analogies in learning is usually explicitly taught in an educational setting and makes use of 
metacognitive strategies, such as understanding how one conceptualises a domain, and 
grasping the educational goal of the analogy in explaining a phenomenon.  
 
Analogy alone is not sufficient for driving conceptual change: other factors are involved, such 
as the student’s prior knowledge (Vosniadou & Skopeliti, forthcoming), but, in conjunction 
with other factors, analogies play a role in structuring the learning environment and in 
conceptual change. Mason (1994) describes the way children use an analogy with the postal 
system, applied metacognitively, to learn a sophisticated conception of blood circulation at 
10 years old. What they acquire is a concept of blood circulation that is interrelated with the 
heart and blood vessels. Acquiring concepts of the rational numbers, typically between 8 and 
12 years old, also draws on the child’s capacity to understand and use analogies (Carey 2009, 
ch. 9).10 Analogy use seem to be more effective in changing concepts in cases when children 
(and adults) not only use the analogy to acquire knowledge about a new domain, but are also 
aware of the nature and instructional purpose of the analogy for learning, of the goal of the 
analogy with respect to the specific domain in question, and of their initial and final 
                                                     
10  Carey also argues that analogising is at work when children acquire concepts of natural numbers (Carey 
2009, ch. 8). This happens much earlier, around 3 years old. However, this does not appear to involve 
the ability to understand explicit analogies. It may instead draw on a more implicit process by which a 
mapping is established between sets of symbols. 
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conceptions. These strategies require the use of analytic metacognition (Mason, 1994; 
Nersessian, 2010).  
 
Most studies have focused on the use of analogies in teaching by the instructor (Duit, 1991; 
Glynn, Duit, & Thiele, 2012; Harrison & Treagust, 2006) or in adults (college age students and 
experts) (Clement, 1987, 1991, 2013). In this context we can see how using analogies for 
introducing new concepts makes use of metacognition. For example, Glynn, Duit, & Thiele 
(2012) suggest a teaching method for introducing the concept of pulsar by analogising it to 
the rotating lamp in a lighthouse. The teacher introduces the target concept, the analogue 
concept and its relevant features, a mapping of similarities, but he also discusses the goal of 
the analogy and its limitations in understanding the target concept. Learning new concepts 
through analogies is especially fruitful for scientific novices and helps the learner acquire 
knowledge that can be used to answer inferential questions about the domain and not just 
basic-knowledge questions, showing that the concept can now be used for inferential 
reasoning (Donnelly & McDaniel, 1993). 
 
One worry with thinking of explicit analogy use as calling for analytic metacognition is that 
educational studies involve a teacher’s explicit instructions in how to use and apply an 
analogy. In our view the application and use of an analogy can often involve analytic 
metacognition, whether that analogy is produced spontaneously or taught explicitly. 
Spontaneous production of analogies may indeed engage metacognition in interesting ways, 
and although we are not aware of studies of spontaneous use of analogies in children, 
spontaneous analogy use and its impact on conceptual change has been explored in college-
age students (Clement, 1987, 2013). Spontaneous analogy production can also sometimes be 
detrimental to conceptual change, if the analogy reinforces the starting conceptual point 
rather than helping the thinker to overcome it (Clement, 2013). Analytic metacognition might 
help the learner to guide the way the use analogies so as to avoid this pitfall (if all goes well).    
 
Recognising a similarity between domains need not be a metacognitive operation. For 
example, children spontaneously make the analogical inference from plants being goal-
directed (like animals) to plants also being living beings, without explicit comparison or 
feedback (Opfer & Siegler, 2004). However, understanding an analogy as a way of thinking 
about a domain does call for metacognition. Where children draw on analogies to acquire new 
scientific and mathematical concepts, from 8 or 9 years old onwards, they appear to be using 
explicit metacognitive considerations to understand the nature and instructional purpose of 
the analogy. They are also plausibly thinking explicitly about the way they themselves 
conceptualise the domain and can compare their previous conceptualisation with the new 
one. Thus, this is a case where an increase in the sophistication of children’s analytic 
metacognitive abilities has an across-the-board effect on the way they acquire new concepts. 
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(8) Predictions 
We have suggested two examples where a change in metacognitive ability opens up a new 
stage in the way the child can acquire new concepts: one earlier, in procedural metacognition, 
and one later, in analytic metacognition.11 Various predictions follow from these hypotheses. 
 
Most obviously, in line with current educational research (Harrison & Treagust, 2006; Mason, 
1994; Vosniadou & Skopeliti, 2019), we predict that individual differences in children’s facility 
in using explicit analogies, typically in the later years of elementary school, will trigger 
differences in how well the individuals acquire sophisticated scientific and mathematical 
concepts. For instance, in their experiment on the influence on analogies on understanding, 
Vosniadou and Skopeliti compare two groups: one group read a scientific text without the 
analogy, while the other group read a text with an analogy. In the latter group differences 
were found in respect to the understanding of the analogy (from no understanding to partial 
understanding to complete understanding): one way of testing the prediction would be to 
compare incremental conceptual change among groups split by how well they understand the 
analogy. 
 
More of a surprise is that there should be a connection between improvements in procedural 
metacognition and a very specific way of acquiring new concepts, i.e. in the process by which 
children get a new concept when they already have a somewhat adequate conceptual 
understanding of a domain. Our hypothesis predicts that individual differences in calibration 
– reduced overconfidence in confidence judgements and JoLs – should correlate with the age 
at which the child begins to acquire new concepts through metacognitive disequilibration. 
 
Both of these changes take place while children are in formal education and have 
overwhelmingly been studied in Europe and America. Looking at these processes cross-
culturally would tell us a lot more about why they come on stream and how culture influences 
them (Proust & Fortier, 2018). For example, in some tasks Mayan children differ in confidence 
levels from German and Japanese children (Kim, Shahaeian, & Proust, 2018). There are also 
cultural differences in the development of analytic metacognition: German children manifest 
meta-memory regarding strategies at an earlier age than American children (Schneider & 
Löffler, 2016). If the changes in analytic and procedural metacognition we have pointed to 
occur at different ages in different cultures, then cross-cultural comparisons at the group level 
are another way to test the correlations predicted in the last paragraph.  
 
More generally, we predict that variations in confidence calibration (connected with different 
factors, such as age or culture, among others) will have an impact on conceptual change. As 
we have seen, overconfidence can act as an obstacle to conceptual change. What is needed 
for a better calibration in a process of conceptual change? Is minimal task experience enough 
(Lipowski, Merriman, & Dunlosky, 2013)? Or is the calibration process a long developmental 
trend? There are ways of lowering confidence by repetition which are effective in adults, as 
shown by the underconfident-with-practice effect (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma'ayan, 2002), an 
effect that children do not show (Lipko et al., 2012). Yet, there is a developmental trend of 
                                                     
11  Important questions for future research also arise for the potential role of metacognition in concept 
use, which we set aside in the introduction; also whether metacognition plays different roles as between 
concept acquisition, concept revision and concept replacement. 
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improved calibration with respect to accuracy that continues beyond childhood: for example 
older adults do not show the underconfident-with-practice effect, but are rather accurate in 
their JoLs, without showing overconfidence like children (Rast & Zimprich, 2009). While 
confidence calibration has been studied in connection to learning it would be interesting to 
explore how it impacts conceptual change and how differences in metacognitive accuracy 
might explain differences in the rates of conceptual change.  
 
 
(9) Conclusion 
We have identified possible connections between stages in metacognitive development and 
conceptual change in children. We focused on the question whether developmental changes 
in metacognition have an across the board impact on conceptual development. There is a 
recognised connection between analytic metacognition and conceptual change: in the case 
we examined, children who are better at using explicit analogies in acquiring new concepts 
seem to change their concepts more easily. Our novel suggestion is that procedural 
metacognition also has a role in conceptual change. We reviewed evidence suggesting that 
changes in procedural metacognition, away from generalised overconfidence and towards 
better calibration, are important in allowing the child to become disequilibrated and thus 
open to new concepts in domains where they already possess functioning concepts. This 
example suggests there may well be other ways in which children’s metacognitive 
development produces wholescale changes in the way they are able to acquire new concepts. 
There has been little systematic investigation of these potentially interesting links, especially 
in the emerging domain of procedural metacognition in childhood. As we have shown, there 
is good reason to expect that this investigation will prove to be fruitful. 
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